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Does Climate Change Justify Compulsory Licensing of 
Green Technology? 
Robert Fair* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The impact of the developing world on global pollution has 
increased dramatically in recent years. China recently surpassed the 
United States as the largest producer of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the 
world.1 Chinese emissions accounted for two-thirds of the worldwide 
increase in CO2 in 2007, and its pollution levels continue to rise.
2 India 
and Russia have also experienced dramatic increases. In 2007, India and 
Russia were each responsible for about ten percent of the increase in 
worldwide emissions.3 In contrast, the European Union decreased its 
emission levels that year.4 
Calls from the developed world for developing countries to reduce 
their increasing share of global pollution are somewhat hypocritical,5 as 
many developed states, particularly those in Western Europe, went 
through a similar stage of development that was accompanied by harmful 
pollution.6 In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, London was 
“bathed in smoke” so toxic that thousands of people died from it; yet air 
pollution received little attention until the 1950s.7 It has been argued that 
 
* University of Pennsylvania Law School, J.D. 2010; Vassar College, B.A. 2004. I would like to 
thank Professor Osagie Imasogie for his thoughtful comments and guidance on this Article. 
 1. John Vidal & David Adam, China Overtakes U.S. as World's Biggest CO2 Emitter, 
GUARDIAN, June 19, 2007, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/jun/19/china.usnews; see also Neth. Envtl. 
Assessment Agency, China Now No. 1 in CO2 emissions; USA in Second Position, 
http://www.pbl.nl/en/dossiers/Climatechange/moreinfo/Chinanowno1inCO2emissionsUSAinsecond
position.html. 
 2. Nether. Envtl. Assessment Agency, Global CO2 emissions: increase continued in 2007 
(June 13, 2008), http://www.pbl.nl/en/publications/2008/GlobalCO2emissionsthrough2007.html. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. West Told to Stop Blaming Developing Countries for Pollution, CHINA DAILY, Jun. 25, 
2007, available at http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/25/content_901695.html. 
 6. Kelly McParland, China Achieves Olympian Pollution Levels, NAT’L POST, Jul. 9, 2008, 
available at http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/posted/archive/2008/07/09/china-achieve-s-
olympian-pollution-levels.aspx; Kevin D. Hill, Smog, Science and the EPA, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 4–
5 (1997). 
 7. Hill, supra note 6, at 4–5. 
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if the developed world was allowed to progress without regard to the 
harmful environmental consequences accompanying that development, 
states currently developing should not be denied the same opportunity. 
While this argument is not wholly without merit, developing states need 
not necessarily choose between economic development and pollution 
reduction. Instead, these states could “leap-frog” the stage of 
development that requires heavy pollution by implementing some of the 
existing and forthcoming technologies that promote sustainable and 
renewable forms of energy.8 
However, the development of such innovative technology is costly. 
To offset these significant costs, most innovative firms and individuals 
seek to protect their inventions with patents, which give them a statutory 
monopoly over the use and dissemination of the technology for at least 
twenty years.9 Strong intellectual property rights (IPR) are important for 
creating the economic incentives necessary for technology firms to 
devote time and money to developing innovative technology.10 However, 
this strong protection also increases costs to consumers in the developing 
states that import these innovations,11 and prevents polluters in these 
states from taking advantage of patented green technology without 
paying for a license.12 States that understandably focus more on reducing 
poverty and increasing economic growth than reducing harmful 
emissions are unable or unwilling to pay for such licenses, and high start-
up costs prevent them from entering the market themselves.13 Thus, 
while strong intellectual property protections increase incentives to 
create innovative clean energy technology that may help reduce harmful 
 
 8. Deborah L. Cohen, VC Group’s Heesen Says Clean Tech Still Hot, REUTERS, Jun. 2, 
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/smallBusinessNews/idUSTRE5516J620090602 
(stating that energy technology investment has increased from two percent five years ago to fifteen 
percent of total venture capital). 
 9. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 229, 
33 I.L.M 1125, 1208 art. 31 (1994), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS] (stating the period of 
patent protection shall be no less than twenty years); Tim Wilson, Undermining Mitigation 
Technology: Compulsory Licensing, Patents and Tariffs, Australian Institute of Public Affairs, Aug. 
2008, 21/1, 4, available at http://www.apec.org.au/docs/08_IPAAASC_MT.pdf. 
 10. Grace K. Avedissian, Note, Global Implications of a Potential U.S. Policy Shift Toward 
Compulsory Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New Era of "Super-Terrorism," 18 AM. U. INT'L L. 
REV. 237, 244–46 (2002). 
 11. Colleen Spring Zimmerman, Overview: Intellectual Property—The New Global Currency, 
in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROP. IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 0.1, 0.5 (Melvin Simensky et al. eds., 
1999). 
 12. Jason Weiner, Sharing Potential and the Potential for Sharing: Open Source Licensing as 
a Legal and Economic Modality for the Dissemination of Renewable Energy Technology , 18 GEO. 
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 277, 278 (2006). 
 13. Wilson, supra note 9, at 4; Weiner, supra note 12, at 278. 
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emissions, those same protections may actually impede the diffusion of 
clean energy technology to the developing world, which is rapidly 
becoming the major source of those emissions.14 
The response to this dilemma from developing states has been 
similar to their response to the issue of whether they have a right to 
pollute. Just as current developed states were great polluters while they 
developed, those same developed states also ignored intellectual property 
rights during their development.15 Developing states see no valid reason 
prohibiting them from doing the same.16 However, rather than 
supporting outright theft of patented energy-efficient technology, 
developing states have advocated for the temporary removal of patent 
protection for such technology.17 
The concept of relaxing IPR with regards to green technology has 
considerable support, both in developing and developed states. U.S. 
President Barack Obama has opined that, “it’s critical for us to lead by 
example by becoming more energy efficient [and by] shar[ing] scientific 
breakthroughs.”18 Even stronger statements have come from the 
developing world. The 2007 Joint Position Paper of Brazil, China, India, 
Mexico and South Africa Participating in the G-8 Summit, stated: 
In order for developing countries to contribute to the efforts 
to address climate change, access to adequate technology is a 
key enabling condition. We need an agreement on transfer of 
technologies at affordable costs for accelerated mitigation 
efforts in developing countries, inter alia through increased 
use of renewable energy, including biofuels, and enhanced 
energy efficiency. Rewards for innovators needs to be 
balanced with common good for humankind.19 
 
Bolivian President Evo Morales advocated the relaxation of IPR 
pertaining to climate change technology “so that all countries can access 
 
 14. Dr. Benjamin K. Sovacool, Placing a Glove on the Invisible Hand: How Intellectual 
Property Rights May Impede Innovation in Energy Research and Development (R&D), 18 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 381, 387 (2008). 
 15. See Battle of Ideas, ECONOMIST, Apr. 23, 2009, available at 
http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13528318 (stating that the United 
States “was the great copyright and patent infringer when it was a developing country in the 18th 
century”). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Wilson, supra note 9. 
 18. Full Text of Barack Obama’s Strasbourg Town Hall with Questions, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 
2009, available at http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2009/04/full-text-of-barack-obama-
in-strasbourg-town-hall.html. 
 19. Joint Position Paper of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa Participating in the 
G-8 Summit, June 8, 2007, available at http://pmindia.nic.in/visits/content.asp?id=155. 
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products already patented. . .free of cost.”20 Nigeria, Indonesia, and even 
the European Parliament have all made similar statements.21 
While the notion of sharing energy efficient technology may be lofty, 
the economic and legal reality is that green technology has become big 
business. The corporations and inventors who create these innovations 
use the global IPR system to profit (sometimes greatly) from them for the 
entire length of the statutory monopoly granted by patents. When IPR 
have been threatened in the past, corporations have taken drastic 
measures in response.22 It is unlikely that these corporations will give up 
these rights without resistance, especially given the recent increase in 
venture capital investment in renewable energy technology.23 Therefore, 
any relaxation of IPR for green technology would have to come not from 
the patent owners themselves, but from the legal institutions that grant 
statutory monopolies to those patent owners. The Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) allows for the 
issuance of compulsory licenses, which could, in theory, be used to 
address the problem posed by increased pollution by the developing 
world.24 
TRIPS allows for compulsory licensing of patented technology 
without the authorization of the patent owner in times of “emergency.”25 
Such licenses have typically been employed in the past for 
pharmaceutical products used to fight epidemics such as AIDS, but the 
scope of compulsory licensing has recently been widened to include 
long-term health problems such as heart disease and cancer.26 With this 
in mind, some argue that environmental pollution may be considered a 
long-term health problem because it leads to the premature death of 
millions each year. There is currently no bar to granting compulsory 
licenses for green technology, and support for such use of compulsory 
licenses arguably exists in other provisions of TRIPS and in certain areas 
of patent law.27 
However, the wide implementation of such a practice would have 
 
 20. Sidney A. Rosenzweig, PFF on Cooling the World By Misappropriating Patent Rights,  
Intellectual Property Watch, Apr. 1, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/04/01/cooling-the-
world-by-misappropriating-patent-rights/. 
 21. Wilson, supra note 9, at 5. 
 22. See infra notes 87–97. 
 23. Michael Hasper, Green Technology in Developing Countries: Creating Accessibility 
Through a Global Exchange Forum, DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 4 (2009). 
 24. Andrew W. Torrance, Patents to the Rescue: Disasters and Patent Law, 10 DEPAUL J. 
HEALTH CARE L. 309, 327 (2007). 
 25. TRIPS, supra note 9, at art. 31. 
 26. See infra Section 3.2. 
 27. See infra Section 3. 
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serious negative ramifications. Increased use of compulsory licensing 
would almost certainly elicit a harmful backlash from the owners of the 
appropriated patents, as well as from their respective states. In addition, 
several key differences between the energy industry and the 
pharmaceutical industry make compulsory licensing far less appropriate 
in the former than in the latter. Finally, there are more effective methods 
of transferring energy-efficient technology to developing states, such as 
removing tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. Thus, while an argument 
can certainly be made for using compulsory licensing of green 
technology to help combat climate change, several drawbacks prevent 
this route from being the best option for effectively transferring green 
technology to developing states. 
II. COMPULSORY LICENSING UNDER TRIPS 
Under TRIPS, all members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
must provide a minimum level of patent protection, which includes the 
right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or importing patented 
inventions for the term of the patent.28 The intellectual property rights set 
forth in TRIPS are enforceable through the WTO’s highly effective 
system of dispute resolution.29 However, those rights are not absolute. 
While the TRIPS agreement does not use the term “compulsory 
licensing,” Article 31 clearly pertains to compulsory licensing and could 
be used to argue for such licensing of green technology.30 Article 31 sets 
forth a procedural prior negotiation requirement between users and 
patent owners that must be met before the patents can be used without 
authorization. However, this requirement may be waived in the case of 
“national emergency, other circumstances of extreme urgency, and in 
cases of public non-commercial use.”31 Under such a scenario, a state 
may allow its citizens to produce the patented invention without giving 
notice to, or receiving authorization from the owner of the patent.32 The 
2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS further encouraged states to take 
advantage of compulsory licensing by stating that “[e]ach Member has 
the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the 
 
 28. TRIPS, supra note 9, at arts. 27, 28, 31. 
 29. Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking of Balancing?: Separating Strands of Fact from Fiction 
Under TRIPS, 34 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 371, 384 (2009). 
 30. Peggy B. Sherman & Ellwood F. Oakley, III, Pandemics and Panaceas: The World Trade 
Organization's Efforts to Balance Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to AIDS Drugs, 41 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 353, 369 (2004). 
 31. TRIPS, supra note 9, at art. 31. 
 32. Sherman, supra note 30, at 369. 
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grounds upon which [compulsory] licenses are granted.”33 
Once a compulsory license has been granted, a state may 
domestically produce the patented technology or import it from abroad, 
as the benefits of compulsory licensing during “national emergencies” 
are not limited to states that have the domestic manufacturing capability 
to produce the licensed product. The 2003 WTO decision entitled 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health authorizes a WTO member, under certain 
circumstances, to grant a compulsory license for exporting a 
pharmaceutical product to a state that faces a “national emergency” but 
lacks the manufacturing capacity necessary to produce that product.34 
The EU has adopted a similar regulation that permits compulsory 
licensing of pharmaceutical products for exportation to developing states 
with “public health problems.”35 
Compulsory licensing provisions exist in TRIPS and in many 
countries’ intellectual property laws because they relate to one of the 
most basic purposes of patent law: to provide incentives to spur 
innovation, specifically for the good of the public that benefits from that 
innovation.36 Generally, the practice of providing incentives for 
innovation by creating a proprietary interest in the resulting technology 
serves the public good. However, economic rewards and the public good 
occasionally conflict, particularly during times of emergency. During 
these times, the patent owner of a product desperately needed to help 
those affected by the emergency situation might keep prices high and 
production low.37 Thus, compulsory licensing in emergency 
circumstances helps serve an underlying purpose of intellectual property 
law. 
III.  PAST THREATS AND USES OF COMPULSORY LICENSING 
While the U.S. Supreme Court observed that “[c]ompulsory 
 
 33. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2 , 41 I.L.M. 755, 755 (2002), [hereinafter Doha Declaration] 
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/tripshealth.pdf. 
 34. World Trade Organization, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540, 43 I.L.M. 509, 510 (2004) [hereinafter 2003 WTO 
Decision] http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/TRIPS_e/implem_para6_e.htm. 
 35. Council Regulation 816/20062006 O.J. (L 157) (May 17, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Council 
Regulation], 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:157:0001:01:EN:HTML. 
 36. Giles S. Rich, Foreword in F. SCOTT KIEFF, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS iii, iii (4th ed. 2008). 
 37. Torrance, supra note 24, at 327. 
WINTER 2009  Climate Change 
27 
 
licensing is a rarity in our patent system”38 there is an established history 
of such licenses being threatened or issued, both in the United States and 
abroad. This Section first discusses governmental threats to ignore patent 
rights, and then considers incidences where governments have gone 
beyond threats and have granted compulsory licenses for certain 
technology. 
A. Threats 
Often a threat by a government to ignore patent rights is enough for 
owners of those rights to lower the prices of their patented products.39 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, letters contaminated with anthrax entered 
the U.S. postal system, resulting in the death of five Americans.40 The 
pharmaceutical company Bayer AG had a patent covering the antibiotic 
Cipro(R) that could be used to treat anthrax infections, but the company 
was unable to produce enough of the drug to keep up with the sudden 
spike in demand.41 The U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services 
started to pressure Bayer publicly about the price and supply of Cipro(R), 
and threatened to ignore the company’s patent.42 Bayer then agreed to 
lower its price by fifty-five percent and considerably increase its capacity 
for manufacturing the antibiotic.43 
A similar situation arose in response to the global bird flu epidemic 
in 2005 and 2006.44 Roche, a pharmaceutical company, owned the patent 
for Tamiflu(R), a potentially lifesaving drug, but was unable to deliver 
all its orders for the drug during the epidemic.45 U.S. Senator Chuck 
Schumer denounced Roche for elevating profits above health concerns 
and demanded that the firm license its technology to other drug-makers 
 
 38. Dawson Chemical v. Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980). 
 39. Jennifer L. Rich, Roche Reaches Accord on Drug with Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2001, 
at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/01/business/roche-reaches-accord-on-drug-
with-brazil.html (describing how Roche agreed to drop the price of an AIDS drug by more than forty 
percent in Brazil after such a threat). 
 40. FBI - Post-9/11 Amerithrax Investigation, 
http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/amerithraxlinks.htm. 
 41. Anthony York, Is It Time to Bust the Cipro Patent?, SALON, Oct. 18, 2001, available at 
http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2001/10/18/cipro_patent/index.html. 
 42. Matt Fleischer-Black, The Cipro Dilemma—In the Anthrax Crisis, Tommy Thompson 
Distorted Patent Law to Save Public Health. Good Move?, 1 AM. LAWYER 53 Jan. 2002, available 
at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro/americanlawyer012002.html. 
 43. Unmesh Kher, Why Roche Released Tamiflu, TIME, Oct. 19, 2005, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1120533,00.html. 
 44. Torrance, supra note 24, at 343. 
 45. Sebastian Mallaby, A Double Dose of Failure, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2005, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/06/AR2005110601013.html. 
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or face legislation compelling it to do so.46 Other states went further. 
Taiwan, India, Thailand, and Argentina said they would completely 
ignore Roche’s patent and manufacture their own versions of 
Tamiflu(R).47 Roche eventually relented and entered into discussions to 
license the production of the drug at more favorable prices.48 
B. Uses 
On occasion, governments have done more than merely threaten to 
invoke their compulsory licensing rights under TRIPS. In confronting an 
AIDS epidemic in 2005, Brazil followed through on its threat to break 
the patents owned by the drug manufacturer Abbott Laboratories. The 
Brazilian legislature approved a bill that suspended the patents and 
authorized local production of generic versions of all drugs used to treat 
HIV.49 The Brazilian government claimed that this bill was compliant 
with its obligations under TRIPS, because it simply suspended these 
patents temporarily due to a health emergency.50 Abbott Laboratories 
subsequently responded to the move by lowering the price it charged for 
a combination of anti-retroviral drugs used to treat HIV, saving Brazil an 
estimated $250 million.51 
Similarly, in 2007, Thailand approved a compulsory license for the 
AIDS drug Kaletra after failing in its attempts to receive a price 
reduction on the drug.52 The license allowed domestic drug makers to 
copy the patent holder’s formula and sell the medicine domestically, 
saving thousands of lives.53 The United States, although unhappy with 
this action, acknowledged Thailand’s legal right to issue the license 
under TRIPS. Additionally, former U.S. President Bill Clinton endorsed 
the decision to grant a compulsory license.54 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.; James Packard Love, Research Note, Recent Examples of the Use of Compulsory 
Licenses on Patents, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L 2 (Mar. 8, 2007), available at 
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/recent_cls.pdf. 
 48. Kher, supra note 43. 
 49. Mary Ann Liebert, Brazil, Abbott Reach Tentative Deal on Kaletra, 24 BIOTECH. L. 
REPORT 583, 583–84 (2005), available at 
http://www.itssd.org/References/Market/biotch%20law%20rptr%20-%2010-2005%20-
%20ITSSD%20cited.pdf. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Keith Alcorn, Abbott to Withhold New Drugs from Thailand in Retaliation for Kaletra 
Compulsory License, AIDS Map News, Mar. 15, 2007, 
http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/00C7641B-57F5-4AB8-8876-9040425D4464.asp. 
 53. Charles Collins-Chase, The Case Against TRIPS-Plus Protection in Developing Countries 
Facing AIDS Epidemics, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 763, 788 (2008). 
 54. Celia Dugger, Clinton Foundation Announces a Bargain on Generic AIDS Drugs, N.Y. 
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Even states incapable of domestically manufacturing the licensed 
products have benefited from compulsory licensing. In 2007, Canada 
took advantage of the 2003 WTO Decision Implementation of Paragraph 
6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
by issuing a compulsory license for the production and export of an 
AIDS drug to Rwanda.55 Compulsory licenses have also been granted by 
Eritrea, Ghana, Guinea, Malaysia, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe for the 
importation of AIDS medication from abroad.56 While incidents of 
compulsory licensing may indeed be rare, they are becoming less so. 
Their use, or threatened use, to provide lower-priced medication to the 
developing world provides a helpful precedent supporting the argument 
that such licensing can be used for green technology. 
IV. MAKING THE CASE THAT CLIMATE CHANGE CONSTITUTES AN 
EMERGENCY FOR THE PURPOSES OF COMPULSORY LICENSING 
As stated above, Article 31 of TRIPS permits compulsory licensing 
in the “case of national emergency” or for “public non-commercial 
use.”57 Issuing compulsory licenses for green technology is unlikely to 
be considered “public non-commercial use” because such technology 
will undoubtedly be attached to some sort of commercial enterprise. Yet 
a case can be made that environmental pollution is a “national 
emergency” in the developing world, and thus compulsory licensing of 
green technology should be permissible. Sixteen of the twenty most 
polluted cities in the world are in China.58 Air pollution alone 
prematurely kills between two and three million people annually,59 and 
about ninety percent of those deaths occur in the developing world.60 
This number is much higher than the combined number of deaths from 
Bird Flu and Anthrax,61 and compulsory licenses were threatened for 
 
TIMES, May 8, 2007, at A9, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/world/09aidsdrugs.html. 
 55. Watson, supra note 54, at 147. 
 56. Love, supra note 47, at 2. 
 57. TRIPS, supra note 9, at art. 31. 
 58. Rachel Oliver, All About: Developing Cities and Pollution, CNN, Mar. 11, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/03/09/eco.cities/index.html. 
 59. World Health Organization (WHO), Estimated Deaths & DALYs Attributable to Selected 
Environmental Risk Factors, by WHO Member State (2002), available at 
http://www.cleanairnet.org/caiasia/1412/article-71943.html. 
 60. Population Information Program, Pollution and Health Risks, Population Reports (2000), 
available at http://www.infoforhealth.org/pr/m15/m15chap2.html. 
 61. WHO, Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) 
(Sept. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2009_09_24/en/index.html 
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each of those emergencies. 
While in the past compulsory licensing has been used primarily for 
pharmaceutical products, Article 31 of TRIPS could conceivably be used 
by a state to 
force the patentee of an eco-friendly invention to allow 
its use by the state. For instance, if a country’s government 
could not wait twenty. . .years before it wished to use the 
invention to reduce carbon emissions, Article 31(b) could be 
used. Similarly, if the patentee of a first eco-friendly 
invention refuses to grant a license to a second patentee of an 
improvement (the dependent patent) of this first invention, 
Article 31(l) could be used to force him to do so.62 
 
Such compulsorily licensing of proprietary renewable energy 
technology would enable domestic firms to develop the capacity to 
produce and deploy clean energy technology.63 While it does not appear 
that any state has attempted to use Article 31 of TRIPS in the context of 
environmental issues such as climate change,64 there is no bar from 
doing so. 
A. The Text of TRIPS and Patent Law History Support Compulsory 
Licensing of Environmentally Friendly Technology 
Although environmental issues are not specifically mentioned in 
Article 31 of TRIPS, there are no subject matter restrictions to the Article 
that prevent its use for green technology,65 and environmental 
considerations are prevalent in other areas of the agreement. Paragraph 2 
of Article 27 allows WTO member states to prohibit the patentability of 
inventions in order “to protect ordre public or morality, 
including. . .avoid[ing] serious prejudice to the environment.”66 No clear 
standard is provided for what is considered ordre public or what is 
considered serious prejudice to the environment,67 but air pollution is 
 
(counting 262 deaths from Bird Flu worldwide); WHO, Anthrax in the United States (Nov. 21, 
2001), available at http://www.who.int/csr/don/2001_11_23/en/index.html (counting five deaths 
from anthrax in the United States). 
 62. Estelle Derclaye, Intellectual Property Rights and Global Warming, 12 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 263, 281 (2008). 
 63. Weiner, supra note 12, at 298. 
 64. Derclaye, supra note 63, at 274. 
 65. Ho, supra note 29, at 397. 
 66. TRIPS, supra note 9, at art. 27. 
 67. Carlos Correa, Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in Developing 
Countries, at 12 (2000), available at http://www.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/h2963e/h2963e.pdf; 
Derclaye, supra note 63, at 274. 
WINTER 2009  Climate Change 
31 
 
certainly harmful to the environment. While this provision pertains to 
requirements for patentability, not compulsory licensing, it could be used 
to support the notion that ignoring patent rights of green technology is 
necessary to “avoid serious prejudice to the environment.” 
In addition to the text of TRIPS and subsequent declarations, the 
effect of patents on the environment is one of the factors taken under 
consideration in other areas of patent law. There have been legal disputes 
on the patentability of inventions that have had or may have an effect on 
the environment, such as genetically modified animals or plants.68 The 
Harvard/Onco Mouse decision, before the European Patent Office 
(EPO), involved the patentability of a genetically modified mouse 
designed to help find the cure for cancer. In this case, the court upheld 
the patent, weighing the “possible risks to the environment” against the 
“usefulness to mankind.”69 In a similar case with an opposite holding, 
the EPO refused a patent application for a mouse that was genetically 
modified to lose hair on the grounds that the harm to the animal was 
greater than the benefit of the invention.70 
These decisions are distinguishable in that they concern the 
patentability of inventions that could potentially harm the environment, 
rather than the potential for ignoring patents on inventions that help the 
environment. Nonetheless, these decisions demonstrate that 
environmental impact is already considered during the application 
process. 
A recent decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit shows that courts can easily do the same in determining whether 
a compulsory license should be issued. In Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor 
Corp., the District Court issued an ongoing-royalty order that, like a 
compulsory license, allowed Toyota (the infringer) to continue to use the 
plaintiff’s patented hybrid automobile technology in exchange for a 
twenty-five dollar royalty payment for every car that used the 
technology.71 Toyota successfully argued that an injunction should not 
be issued against its use of the patented technology because doing so 
would be contrary to the public interest in reducing harmful emissions 
and dependence on foreign oil.72 As set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court 
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in eBay v. MercExchange, public interest is one of the four factors 
considered by courts in determining whether an injunction in patent 
infringement suits should be ordered.73 While the Federal Circuit in 
Paice vacated and remanded the ongoing-royalty rate because it was not 
supported by any reason why twenty-five dollars was an appropriate 
royalty, it did not object to the District Court’s decision to allow Toyota 
to continue to use the technology without the plaintiff’s permission.74 
Thus, the text of TRIPS and patent case law involving both patentability 
and compulsory licensing can be used to support the compulsory 
licensing of green technology. 
B. The Use of Compulsory Licensing Has Broadened in Scope 
Some argue that compulsory licensing for “emergencies” should not 
be applied to long-term environmental problems like climate change,75 
and should only be available for widespread epidemics where access to a 
particular drug is insufficient.76 However, both the 2003 WTO Decision 
and the 2006 EU Regulation on Compulsory Licensing expressly state 
that no limits exist on the scope of diseases for which compulsory 
licenses may be granted.77 While the use of compulsory licensing has 
been considerably more common for drugs that treat widespread 
epidemics like AIDS, there has been a recent shift toward using 
compulsory licensing for a wider spectrum of public health issues.78 
For example, in 2007, Thailand became the first state to expand the 
scope of compulsory licensing to chronic diseases when it issued a 
compulsory license for the heart medication Plavix.79 In 2008, Thailand 
went further by granting compulsory licenses for breast and lung cancer 
medicines,80 and threatened to do the same for anti-cholesterol drugs.81 
Applications for compulsory licensing for several cancer drugs are also 
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being considered in India.82 
While Thailand’s broadened use of compulsory licensing has 
received significant criticism,83 this use does not appear to violate any 
portion of TRIPS.84 Widening the scope of compulsory licensing to 
include long-term public health issues such as breast cancer could 
potentially open the door for compulsory licensing of technology that can 
help reduce climate change, a problem that certainly impacts long-term 
public health. 
V. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF ISSUING COMPULSORY LICENSES FOR GREEN 
TECHNOLOGY 
Despite the legal availability and initial appeal of compulsory 
licenses for green technology, such licensing would result in 
disadvantages for the licensing state and for innovation generally. Many 
criticisms of compulsory licensing in the pharmaceutical context, such as 
decreased incentives to innovate and potential economic backlash, apply 
with equal force in the context of energy-efficient technology. Moreover, 
key differences between the two fields make green technology a 
considerably less appropriate candidate for compulsory licensing. 
A. Compulsory Licensing Creates Economic Backlashes 
Even if a developing state was convinced that it could legally grant 
compulsory licenses for a particular green technology, it would 
undoubtedly fear the international backlash that would likely follow. 
Such fears are not without good reason, as repercussions have occurred 
in the past. The United States in particular has dealt harshly with states 
that have attempted to issue compulsory licenses.85 
Although a state’s grant of a particular compulsory license may 
technically comply with TRIPS, and thus enjoy immunity from 
challenges through the WTO’s dispute resolution system, the state may 
nonetheless suffer unilateral trade sanctions.86 For example, after 
Thailand approved a compulsory license for the AIDS drug Kaletra, the 
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United States elevated Thailand to its “priority watch list,”87 a 
designation that heightens the possibility of trade sanctions against the 
state.88 Similarly, in 2005 the Bush administration threatened sanctions 
against Brazil if it followed through on threats to issue compulsory 
licenses for AIDS drugs.89 
The potential economic backlash accompanying the issuance of a 
compulsory license is not limited to governmental action, but may also 
include actions by private parties. Patent owners may retaliate to a state’s 
grant of a compulsory license on one of their patented drugs by removing 
other drugs from that state’s market.90 After Thailand issued a 
compulsory license for Kaletra, the owner of the patent to the drug 
(Abbott Laboratories) subsequently announced that it would no longer 
sell some of its newest products in Thailand, including a different AIDS 
drug that would have been highly desirable locally.91 Such conduct by 
pharmaceutical companies does not violate any international or domestic 
law, because there is no requirement that companies sell their patented 
technology in every state.92 
A similar case arose after Egypt granted a compulsory license to a 
local company for the manufacture of Viagra in 2002.93 Pfizer, the patent 
owner of Viagra, expressed great displeasure and subsequently cancelled 
plans to build a state-of-the-art production facility in Egypt, noting that 
many other states in the region were eager for such an investment.94 
Thus, the economic and social repercussions from both private and 
governmental sectors for a state that has granted a compulsory license 
may outweigh the costs saved by the issuance of the license itself.95 
B. Strong Intellectual Property Rights Are Necessary for Long-
Term Innovation and Diffusion of Energy Efficient Technology 
Innovative green technology firms require strong IPR to generate the 
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funds needed to operate and create new technology.96 These firms 
require enormous amounts of capital, and the principal collateral for 
attracting funding comes from the proprietary interest they gain in the 
resulting technology.97 Regarding such firms, one commentator stated 
that “patents are the foundation of their existence. Weaken that 
foundation and the house quickly crumbles.”98 Many renewable energy 
technologies are not profitable even with patents and receive significant 
government subsidies.99 Without the promise of significant property 
rights in the subsequent technology, funding and subsidies will be much 
harder to acquire as the incentives to invest in and create innovative 
green technology may be diminished or eliminated.100 While compulsory 
licensing might be attractive for the short-term diffusion of a particular 
energy-efficient technology, it decreases long-term investment in the 
creation of more innovative technology, and discourages the diffusion of 
technology for which compulsory licenses are not granted. 
Joint ventures between multinational companies from developed 
states and local companies from developing states have proven effective 
as a method of transferring technology to those developing states.101 
However, a state’s use of compulsory licensing for a particular 
technology decreases the incentive for other multinational companies to 
engage in joint ventures with local firms in that state, as the lack of 
protection serves as a warning to companies that the state may not 
respect their own patent protections if they choose to do business 
there.102 
Such arguments against compulsory licensing are also raised in the 
pharmaceutical context as reasons for why the practice is detrimental, 
rather than beneficial to long-term public health.103 The research and 
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development of pharmaceutical products is costly and time-
consuming.104 The process also involves a high chance of failure, 
creating great economic risk. Pharmaceutical companies use profits from 
successful products to both offset losses from previous failures and fund 
future research.105 Critics of compulsory licensing argue that if the 
patent rights on those successful drugs are ignored in some states, the 
economic incentive to invest in future drug research is diminished even 
in those states where patent rights are upheld.106 
While many of the same defenses of compulsory licensing in the 
pharmaceutical context may apply with equal force to green technology, 
there are key differences between the two fields. Although compulsory 
licensing might be appropriate in the pharmaceutical context, there are 
many reasons why the same course is not the most efficient method for 
the diffusion of green technology. 
C. The Nature of the Green Technology Industry Is Not Appropriate 
for Compulsory Licensing 
Though the proponents of compulsory licensing emphasize certain 
benefits created by such a practice, those benefits are not applicable to 
green technology. For instance, proponents of compulsory licensing 
contend that while weak intellectual property protections seem to 
decrease economic incentives for transnational corporations to engage in 
joint ventures with local companies in developing states, other 
investment considerations play a much bigger role.107 Some studies have 
shown that strong patent rights actually have no impact on attracting 
foreign investment to low income states.108 This is likely because the 
markets of most poor states are not large or lucrative enough and are 
usually too geographically distant for a state’s decision to strengthen IPR 
to influence a multinational corporation’s decision of whether or not to 
invest in that state.109 
However, such an argument is more relevant in the pharmaceutical 
context than in the context of green technology. While poor states may 
not benefit from stronger intellectual property protections, studies show 
that strong patent rights are positively correlated to attracting foreign 
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direct investment in middle-income states.110 Granting compulsory 
licenses can lead to a huge loss of foreign investment to middle-income 
states,111 a category that includes China, India and Russia, which are the 
major contributors to the increase in global pollution.112 Such was the 
case after Egypt granted a compulsory license for Viagra in 2002.113 
After this occurred, foreign direct investment declined in Egypt, despite 
its cheap labor force and relatively educated populace.114 Compulsory 
licensing of AIDS medications might not negatively affect the least 
developed states because their level of foreign direct investment is not 
related to the strength of their intellectual property protections.115 
However, the use of compulsory licensing of green technology by those 
middle-income states most responsible for the increase in global 
pollution will likely be accompanied by a drop in foreign investment . 
Supporters of compulsory licensing also point out that while the 
proprietary interests created by strong IPR help create the incentives 
needed to develop truly innovative technology, strong IPR may also 
inhibit follow-on innovations,116 since the technical capabilities of 
developing states are mainly focused on the adaptation and improvement 
of technologies from the developed world.117 The current green 
technology patents are predominantly for minor, specific improvements 
on the prior art, and, as such, strong IPR may inhibit technological 
development of these sorts of innovations.118 
However, the existence of a plethora of minor, specific 
improvements in energy-efficient technology means that compulsory 
licenses would have to be granted on a variety of innovations to 
effectively solve the environmental emergency because unlike one life-
saving drug, there “will not be any one technology that will be necessary 
or sufficient on its own to solve climate change.”119 Moreover, market 
competition among manufacturers and sellers of these improvements 
already keeps prices down. In the pharmaceutical industry, most 
breakthrough drugs have no substitute and thus the patent owner has a 
 
 110. Hutchison, supra note 104, at 529. 
 111. Bird, Impact of Compulsory Licensing, supra note 104, at 330. 
 112. The World Bank, Data & Statistics: Country Groups, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20421402~p
agePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html#Lower_middle_income. 
 113. Bird, Essential Medicines, supra note 94, at 5. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Hutchison, supra note 10, at 529. 
 116. Id. at 527–28. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Rosenzweig, supra note 19. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 6 
38 
 
monopoly over the solution and can charge high prices for the duration 
of the patent.120 However, because the basic technological solutions in 
the renewable energy sector are no longer patented and have become 
prior art,121 the value added portion of the exclusive right of the patent 
owner as to each minor improvement of that technology is quite small.122 
These small improvements compete with each other, preventing the 
formation of a monopoly on the overall technology, which, in turn, keeps 
prices down.123 While those prices might still not be low enough for 
developing states to take advantage of them, this is not a result of the 
monopolistic market imperfections common in the pharmaceutical 
industry. As such, the removal of patent protection may do little to lower 
prices. 
In addition to problems with incentives, there are also problems with 
definitions. If compulsory licenses may be granted for energy-efficient 
technology, it will be difficult to identify what actually constitutes “green 
technology” suitable for such licenses.124 Any patented technology that 
accomplishes its goal with a little more efficiency or with a slightly 
longer lifespan could be considered “green.” Granting compulsory 
licenses for every technology that fits such a definition may effectively 
eliminate intellectual property rights on most innovative technologies 
and the incentives those rights create.125 
Furthermore, inadequate manufacturing capabilities may impede the 
value of compulsory licensing in the context of green technology. Even if 
compulsory licenses for a particular product are granted in a certain state, 
such a license may be worthless if that state lacks the technological and 
manufacturing capabilities to produce that product. For example, if a 
state wishes to make effective use of a compulsory license on a 
pharmaceutical product, it must either have the manufacturing capacity 
to produce the drug domestically, or be able to import the products from 
a state (e.g., India) that is able and willing to do so.126 Even though 
Thailand was able to grant compulsory licenses for AIDS drugs and heart 
medication, domestic production has proven to be too expensive, and 
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access to these medicines has actually decreased.127 
For states without technological and manufacturing capabilities, 
importation is the only available method to acquire green technology. 
The 2003 WTO Decision discussed above allows compulsory licenses 
for exports of “pharmaceutical product(s)” under certain conditions.128 
Canada took advantage of this provision when it used a compulsory 
license to export AIDS drugs to Rwanda.129 However, using compulsory 
licensing to export patented products to developing states is much more 
feasible for products like pharmaceutical drugs (which are small) than it 
is for green technologies (which are sometimes massive). 
Even if importation is feasible for a particular green technology, it is 
unclear whether the 2003 WTO Decision goes beyond pharmaceutical 
products and can be used in the context of green technology. The 2003 
WTO Decision defines “pharmaceutical product” very broadly as “any 
patented product . . . needed to address public health problems”130 and 
the 2001 Doha Declaration clearly states that “each [m]ember has the 
right to determine what constitutes a national emergency.”131 
Consequently, the 2003 WTO Decision is meant to be broad in scope. 
However, it states that member obligations under Article 31(f) of the 
TRIPS agreement may be waived only “for the purposes of production 
[and export] of a pharmaceutical product.”132 A state trying to extend the 
scope of compulsory licensing beyond the realm of pharmaceutical 
products would risk violating the 2003 WTO Decision. Therefore, if a 
developing state lacks the technological capability to domestically 
produce the particular green technology for which a compulsory license 
is granted, and if it is either unfeasible or illegal (under WTO rules) to 
import such technology from abroad, then that compulsory license is 
essentially worthless. The state would be left without the benefits of the 
license, while still attracting the negative backlash discussed above. 
D. More Efficient Methods Exist for the Diffusion of Green 
Technology 
The key differences between the green technology industry and the 
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pharmaceutical industry not only make the former a less appropriate 
target for compulsory licensing, but also allow for alternative, more 
efficient methods for the diffusion of green technology. In contrast to 
pharmaceutical products, the large size of most energy-efficient products 
allows for the implementation of a tiered pricing system, sometimes 
called “equity pricing,” where poorer states pay less than richer states for 
access to the same technology.133 One of the main reasons 
pharmaceutical products are not sold at a significant discount in 
developing states is the fear of re-importation.134 Large price differences 
among states inevitably lead to the re-importation of pharmaceutical 
products to developed states at lower prices than those sold 
legitimately.135 Such parallel importation cannot be challenged, as the 
principle of exhaustion (similar to the first-sale doctrine of U.S. patent 
law) prevents this practice from violating TRIPS or any other WTO 
provision.136 The risk of re-importation eliminates any altruistic or 
commercial incentive that pharmaceutical companies might have to offer 
lower prices on drugs to developing states.137 However, such fears do 
not apply to green technology. While pharmaceutical products sold at a 
discount in a third state can be easily shipped back to their state of origin, 
“the solar farm installed in India [at a discount] will not be put on a 
midnight barge to the United States.”138 Tiered pricing is thus an option 
available to disburse innovative green technology to developing states 
without breaking patents. 
Rather than relaxing IPR on green technology through compulsory 
licensing, it would be more beneficial to relax tariff and non-tariff trade 
barriers in general,139 or at least specifically with regards to 
environmentally friendly industries.140 The United States and Europe 
proposed this course of action at the UN Climate Conference in Bali in 
2007, but India and Brazil rejected the proposal since it was not 
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comprehensive enough and did not include bio-fuels such as ethanol.141 
The United States currently imposes a tariff on Brazilian ethanol, despite 
the fact that it is economically cheaper and less environmentally 
damaging than U.S. corn-based ethanol.142 The World Bank estimates 
that a comprehensive effort to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers on 
the eighteen developing states that produce the greatest amount of 
greenhouse gases would increase the diffusion of green technology to 
those states by three to sixty-three percent, depending on the 
technology.143 The key differences between green technology and 
pharmaceutical products make the former a considerably less appropriate 
candidate for compulsory licensing, and more efficient methods are 
available to effectively spread green technology to the developing world. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The continued global increase in environmental pollution, as well as 
the growing role of the developing world in that increase, is certainly 
troubling and is likely a “national emergency” under TRIPS. As such, the 
diffusion of existing and future energy-efficient technology to the 
developing world is critical to addressing this emergency. Given the 
emphasis of the Obama administration on green technology, the recent 
increase in funding for research in this area is likely to continue in the 
near future.144 However, this increase in funding will likely be coupled 
with the desire for proprietary interests in the resulting technology. 
While a case can certainly be made for the right of developing countries 
to ignore those interests through the use of compulsory licensing, there 
are numerous downsides to taking that route, and there are alternative 
methods for effectively distributing green technology, such as tiered-
pricing schemes and the relaxation of trade barriers between states. 
While patent protections may impede the diffusion of green technology 
to developing states, granting compulsory licenses is neither the most 
feasible nor the most effective means of solving the problem. 
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